Olf Theordore Stevensen, Jr., and Barbara Ann Stevensen v. Nick N. Nikols, DAB Associates, a partnership, George anagnostakis, George Bruce Breinholt and Welden L. Daines : Reply Brief of Defendants-Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Olf Theordore Stevensen, Jr., and Barbara Ann
Stevensen v. Nick N. Nikols, DAB Associates, a
partnership, George anagnostakis, George Bruce
Breinholt and Welden L. Daines : Reply Brief of
Defendants-Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Hardin A. Whitney; Wayne G. Petty; Moyle and Draper; Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
Nikols.
James A. Arrowsmith; Watkins and Faber; Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Stevensen v. Nikols, No. 14006.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/127
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN, JR., ) 
and BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN, 
) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
) 
vs. Case No. 14006 
) 
NICK N. NIKOLS, DAB ASSOCIATES, 
a partnership, GEORGE ANAG- ) 
NOSTAKIS, GEORGE BRUCE BREIN-
HOLT and WELDEN L. DAINES, ) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
oooOooo 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE PETER F. LEARY, JUDGE 
HARDIN A. WHITNEY 
WAYNE G. PETTY 
Moyle & Draper 
600 Deseret Plaza Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
JAMES A. ARROWSMITH 
Watkins & Faber 
606 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
I! 1 
Cbrfc Supreme Cojirtt Hh 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN, JR., 
and BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
NICK N. NIKOLS, DAB ASSOCIATES 
a partnership, GEORGE ANAG-
NOSTAKIS, GEORGE BRUCE BREIN-
HOLT and WELDEN L. DAINES, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
oooOooo 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE PETER F. LEARY, JUDGE 
HARDIN A. WHITNEY 
WAYNE G. PETTY 
Moyle & Draper 
600 Deseret Plaza Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
JAMES A. ARROWSMITH 
Watkins & Faber 
606 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Case No. 14006 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT . . . . . . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO HEAR 
POINTS I AND II OF PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL BECAUSE 
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED, 
AND THE APPEAL ON APPELLANTS' POINTS I AND 
II SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON 
THE DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLAT-
ERAL ESTOPPEL 
POINT III. THE PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE TO CURE DEFAULT OR 
QUIT AND NOTICE TO QUIT ARE DEFECTIVE AND 
INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT AN ACTION IN UNLAWFUL 
DETAINER 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO DEFENDANT NIKOLS WAS PROPER 
A. The Lease Agreement Provides for Award 
of Attorney's Fees 
B. When the Trial Court Specifically Dis-
missed Plaintiffs' Complaint Against 
Defendants, No Cause of Action, the 
Court Should Have Found as a Matter 
of Law that the Plaintiffs Had 
Breached the Covenant of Quiet and 
Peaceful Possession 
POINT V. ANY CHANGE IN THE OPERATION OF THE LEASED 
PREMISES WAS NOT A BREACH OF THE LEASE . . . 
A. 
B. 
The Required Food Was Available at All 
Required Times 
In Absence of Specific Limitation in the 
Lease, a Tenant May Use the Premises for 
Whatever Lawful Purpose He Desires . . . 
1 
1 
2 
2 
8 
19 
27 
32 
32 
34 
36 
37 
38 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
C. There Was No Evidence That the Defen-
dants Ever Refused Food Service or 
Entry of a Member of the Salt Lake 
Athletic Club 40 
D. The Premises Were Operated as a Public 
Restaurant Consistent with the Terms 
of the Lease 41 
POINT VI. THE ALLEGED BREACHES CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFFS 
ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO RESULT IN A FORFEITURE 
OF THE DEFENDANTS' LEASE AGREEMENT 45 
CONCLUSION 48 
CASES CITED 
American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 U.2d 432, 464 P.2d 592 . 28 
Arnold v. Krigbaum, 146 Pac. 423 (Cal. 1915) 16 
Askew v. Parker, 312 P.2d 342 (Cal.Ct. of App., 4th Dist., 
1957) 44 
Beck v. Giordano, 356 P.2d 264 (Colo. 1960) . . . . . . . . 38,47 
Bedford Ind. Co. v. Fobe, 180 P.2d 361 )2d Dist. Cal., 
1947) 26 
Brandley v. Lewis, 97 Utah 217. 92 P.2d 338 (1939) . . . . 11,13 
Brooks v. State (1916), 19 Ga.App. 3, 90 S.E. 989 43 
Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196 P.2d 714 (1948) . . 28 
Chopot v. Foster, 318 P.2d 976 (Wash. 1957) 45 
Coombs v. Johnson, 26 U.2d 8, 484 P.2d 155 (1971) 10,13 
In re Crowe, 483 P.2d 1206 (Cal. 1971) 22 
D & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 U.2d 442, 503 P.2d 
1216 (1972) 33 
Dunbar v. Hanson, 68 Utah 398, 250 Pac. 982 (1926) . . . . 13,16 
E. J. Korvette Co. v. Parker Pen Co., 17 F.R.D. 267 
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) 15 
In re Ekker's Estate, 19 U.2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967) . . . 16 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Fernandez v. Purdue, 30 U.2d 389, 518 P.2d 684 (1974) . . . 9, 
Fulford v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of City of 
Dothan, 256 Ala. 336, 54 A.2d 580 (1951) . . . 42 
Gessel v. Jones, 427 P.2d 295 (Mont. 1967) 22 
Ginter v. Commonwealth, 262 S.W.2d 178 (Ct. of App., Ken., 
1953) 44 
Group Property, Inc. v. Bruce, 348 P.2d 761 (4th Dist., 
Cal., 1952) 25 
Hubble v. Cole, 13 S.E. 1441 (Va. 1891) . . . . . . ."'.' . . 35 
Hunsaker v. Harris, 37 Utah 226, 109 P. 1 12 
James B. Day & Co. v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 
387 (N.D. 111. 1973) 15 
Julian v. Gossner, 229 P.2d 786 (3d Dist., Cal., 1951) '". . 26 
Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good Roads Oil Co., 214 Cal. 435, 
6 P.2d 71, 80 A.L.R. 453) 25 
Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., 6 U.2d 51, 305 P.2d 503 
(1957) 20 
Kuiken v. Garrett, 51 N.W.2d 149, 41 A.L.R.2d 1397 
(Iowa 1952) 34 
Leograndis v. Liquor Control Commission, 149 Conn. 507, 
182 A.2d 9 (Sup.Ct.Err. 1962) 41 
Lockhart v. State (1853), 10 Tex. 275 43 
Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., 86 P.2d 102 (Cal. 1939) . 44 
Murphy v. Paumie, 37 Utah 228, 109 P. 2 12 
Murphy v. Traynor, 135 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1943) 46 
Peachey v. Boswell, 167 N.E.2d 48, 89 A.L.R.2d 801 
(Ind. 1960) 43 
Port of Walla Walla v. Sunglow Producers, Inc., 504 P.2d 
324 (Wash.App. 1972) 24 
Riter v. Cayias, 19 U.2d 358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967) 16 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
Page I 
Signal Oil Co. v. Stebick, 245 P.2d 217 (Wash. 1952) . . . . 25 i 
Slim Olson, Inc. v. Winegar, 122 Utah 80, 246 P.2d 608 
(1952) 14 
... 1 
Spanish Fork Packing Co. v. House of Fine Meats, Inc., 
29 U.2d 312, 508 P.2d 1186 (1973) 33 
Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 U.2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 
(1973) 16 
In re Town of West Jordan, 7 U.2d 393, 326 P.2d 105 (1958) . 20 
United States v. Gerbus Bros. Construction Co., 57 F.R.D. 
206 (E.D. Ky. 1972) 14 
Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 U.2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971) . . 16 
Wagner v. Olsen, 25 U.2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971) 16 
Weit v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. 
of Chicago, 60 F.R.D. 5 (N.D. 111. 1973) . . . 15 
Western Builders and Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Felmley, 391 
P. 2d 383 (Ore. 1964) 46 
Weyer v. Peterson, 16 U.2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965) . . . . 17 
Wharton v. Zenger, 186 P.2d 287 (Kan. 1947) 22 
STATUTES CITED 
§20-14-1, Salt Lake City Ordinances . 41 
78-36-1, et seq., U.C.A 7,9 
78-36-3(5), U.C.A. 7.27 
78-36-11, U.C.A 9,13,17 
Rule 13(a), U.R.C.P. 12,13 
Rule 78, U.R.C.P. . . . . • 9 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
30 Am.Jur. 920, Judgments, §178 21 
30 Am.Jur. 920, Judgments, §415 21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
4A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, §431, pp. 77-78 18 
4A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, §431, p. 82 18 
51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, §104 (b) , pp. 680, 683 . . . 46 
70 C.J.S., Place, pp. 1095-6 42 
73 C.J.S., Public, pp. 274-5 42 
73C.J.S., Public, p. 276 42 
3 Moore's Federal Practice, 1(13.13, p. 13-297 14 
3 Moore's Federal Practice, 1(13.13, pp. 13-300-302 14 
v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOOOO 
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN, JR., ) 
and BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
NICK N. NIKOLS, DAB ASSOCIATES, 
a partnership, GEORGE ANAG- ) 
NOSTAKIS, GEORGE BRUCE BREIN-
HOLT and WELDEN L. DAINES, ) 
> » I .-:*i : -.J -
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
000O000 
' . .... : . -.-••• • •. -.vj ••' ; U . .?;•= ' T - : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiffs-appellants, 
as lessors, pursuant to the forcible entry and detainer 
statute (Chapter 36, Title 78, U.C.A.), for certain alleged 
violations of a written lease agreement. The lessees (defen-
dants-respondents) counterclaimed for violation of the 
covenant of quiet and peaceful possession, for malicious 
prosecution, attorney's fees and punitive damages. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint 
and three of defendant Nikols' counts in his counterclaim, 
awarded attorney's fees to defendant Nikols pursuant to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Count III of his counterclaim in the amount of $3,665.63, 
plus costs, and awarded to defendants DAB Associates, George 
Anagnostakis, George Bruce Breinholt and Welden L. Daines 
attorney's fees in the amount of $3,175, plus $613.01 for 
food and services supplied to plaintiffs' customers. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Nikols prays the judgment be affirmed 
except in the following respects, which should be reversed 
as error: (1) the trial court's denial of defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss based upon waiver, collateral estoppel and 
res judicata; (2) the trial court's denial of defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss for defective notice; (3) the trial court's 
dismissal of Nikols' counterclaim against plaintiffs for 
violation of the covenant of peaceful and quiet possession. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The "Statement of Facts" in plaintiffs' brief con-
tains so much irrelevant material that defendant Nikols is 
compelled to state the facts accurately. 
Plaintiffs are lessees of certain real property 
located in Salt Lake County which is improved and on which 
they operate the Salt Lake Athletic Club. Plaintiffs sub-
leased to defendant Nikols or or about December 1, 1971, a 
portion of the premises which they lease. The material 
portions of the sublease (Ex. 13-P) are as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4. Use of Premises. Heretofore Sub-
lessor has prepared and served food and 
beverages on the above-described premises 
in operating the Towne House Athletic Club 
thereon. Sublessee assumes the operation 
of preparing and serving such food and 
beverages to the members of the said Club 
in the main dining room and kitchen area. 
Sublessee shall have such use of the pre-
mises as shall be reasonable and desirable 
to facilitate the preparation and dispensing 
of such foods and beverages. Sublessee 
shall use said premises strictly in accord 
with all applicable federal, state and 
local laws, rules and ordinances. 
5. Scope of Operation. Sublessee 
shall have available and prepare and 
serve to members of the said Club on 
the premises food and beverages in the 
types and qualities presently being 
served and shall serve the same on the 
days and hours when the same are pre-
sently available. Food and beverages 
are served on the days and at the times 
as follows: 
Lunch Monday through Friday 
11:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. 
Dinner Saturday 
7:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. 
In addition, Sublessee shall have sandwiches 
and drinks available Monday through Saturday 
from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. 
Sublessee may offer additional ser-
vice as he, in his sole discretion, shall 
determine. 
9. Opening to Public. Sublessor and 
Sublessee agree that if in Sublessee's 
opinion after assuming the operations on 
the premises, there is not sufficient food 
and beverage business from the Club mem-
bers to make such business profitable for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Sublessee, then Sublessee may open the 
premises to the public and make the same 
a public restaurant. In such event, how-
ever, Sublessee shall change the name of 
said restaurant so that it will not be 
identified as a part of the Towne House 
Athletic Club. 
16. Default and Termination. If 
sublessee fails to pay any rent when it 
is due or within thirty (30) days after 
written notice of such failure, Sublessor 
shall have a lien on Sublessee's personal 
property on said premises and may bring 
suit for recovery of the leased premises 
and/or to recover judgment for any or all 
delinquent installments including court 
and other costs and attorneys fees. 
Sublessor and Sublessee agree that if 
either defaults in any of the conditions and 
terms of this lease, the defaulting party 
shall pay all costs and expenses, including 
attorney fees, which may arise or accrue 
,L r * from enforcing this lease or in obtaining 
possession of the premises or in pursuing 
any remedy provided by the laws of the 
State of Utah whether by filing suit or 
otherwise. 
1
 On or about January 7, 1974, Nikols subleased the 
restaurant premises to DAB Associates, who thereafter oper-
ated Aggie's Club and Restaurant on the premises. Each of 
the lease provisions in the Stevensen-Nikols lease described 
above is identical in the Nikols-DAB Associates lease. DAB 
Associates expanded the operation and holds a Class "C" beer 
license issued by Salt Lake City (Ex. 12-P). DAB Associates 
also has a food and sanitary permit issued by the Salt Lake 
City-County Health Department for a restaurant, cabaret and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Class "C" beer operation (Ex. 10-P). On or about the 4th 
day of June, 1974, the defendants Nick N. Nikols and DAB 
Associates were served with a summons and complaint by the 
plaintiffs Olaf Theodore Stevensen and Barbara Ann Stevensen, 
in Civil No. 219945, in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. In that action, the plaintiffs made 
the following allegations: 
4. By the terms of said principal 
sublease, defendant Nick N. Nikols cove-
nanted that he would not allow any liens 
to be placed against the premises. Defen-
dant Nikols has allowed a lien to be 
placed against the premises and has not 
discharged the same. 
F 5. By the terms of said principal 
sublease, defendant Nick N. Nikols assumed 
the operation of preparing and serving 
food and beverages to the members of said 
club. Defendant Nikols and his subtenant 
have required Towne House members to pay a 
cover charge for use of the restaurant 
facilities and have thereby violated the 
terms of said principal sublease. 
6. By the terms of said principal 
sublease, defendant Nick N. Nikols assumed 
the operation of preparing and serving 
food and beverages to members of the Club. 
Defendant Nikols and his subtenants re-
fused to allow minor members of the Towne 
House Club to use the restaurant facili-
ties on occasion and have thereby violated 
the terms of said principal sublease. 
8. By the terms of said principal 
sublease, defendant Nick N. Nikols was 
required to prepare and serve to members 
of the Club food and beverages in the 
types and qualities served by plaintiffs 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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when they operated the Club. Defendant
 £, 
p
 Nikols and his subtenant have failed to 
provide the same quality of food and ser-
1
 vice previously supplied to members. 
• **
!
 * -* •
 r
.t • ^ ^ <* 
9. By the terms of said principal 
. . sublease, in the event there was insuffi- ,r $xk
 c i e n t f00(j and beverage business from 
Club members, defendant was permitted , ... ,% 
to open the premises to the public and 
make the same a public restaurant. De-
fendant Nikols and his subtenant have 
opened the premises but have failed to 
operate the same as a public restaurant. 
\ ' Thereafter, rent for the months of June and July 
were paid by defendants and received and accepted by plain-
tiffs. The Court, upon defendants1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment, held that the defendants were entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint 
with prejudice (R. 320). 
.-' On or about the 26th day of August, 1974, the 
defendants were served with plaintiffs' Notice to Cure 
Default or Quit (Ex. 5-P). On or about the 5th day of 
September, 1974, the plaintiff served the defendants with a 
Notice to Quit the leased premises (Ex. 4-P). Subsequently, 
on or about the 12th day of September, 1974, the plaintiffs 
filed their complaint in the instant action in the Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The 
Notice to Quit, Notice to Cure Default or Quit and the 
complaint set forth identical alleged breaches of the lease. 
The complaint in the instant action includes five claimed 
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breaches of the lease which were included in the complaint 
in the prior civil action. Those claims which are repeated 
are in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 10 of the complaint (R. 238 
Plaintiffs' action is based upon the unlawful 
detainer statute, Section 78-36-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno-
tated, In paragraphs 12 and 13 of the complaint, plaintiffs 
made specific reference to the unlawful detainer statute, 
78-36-3(5), Utah Code Annotated, and stated the following in 
paragraph 15 of said complaint: 
As a result of defendants1 failure to cure 
said defaults and pay rent, they are in 
unlawful detainer of the leased premises 
and plaintiffs are entitled to an order 
from the court evicting defendants from 
the leased premises and restoring the 
possession of the same to plaintiffs. 
In the prayer of the complaint, the plaintiffs asked for 
treble damages, as provided in the unlawful detainer statute. 
Defendant Nikols moved for dismissal of the action 
because of the bar of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
(R. 276). After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the 
trial court denied the motion (R.305). 
At the commencement of the trial, the defendants 
again moved for dismissal of the plaintiffs1 complaint. The 
motion was based upon the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel (R. 4-5), and that the notices served 
upon the defendants were defective (R. 6). The motion to 
dismiss based upon res judicata and collateral estoppel was 
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denied (R. 4-5), and the motion based upon defective notice 
was taken under advisement and is deemed denied in the 
Court's judgment because no specified ruling was made thereon. 
On the 31st day of January, 1975, judgment was 
entered by the Honorable Peter F. Leary, District Judge of 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. Counts I, II and IV of Nikols1 counterclaim were 
dismissed, no cause of action. Nikols was awarded attor-
ney's fees based upon Count III of his counterclaim, the 
second paragraph of which count reads in material part as 
follows: 
2. By virtue of the provisions of 
paragraph 16 of the sublease agreement, 
Exhibit "A" to Plaintiffs' Complaint, this 
1
 Defendant is entitled to recover attorney's
 f ] 
fees in connection with the defense of 
t this action. This defendant is unable to 
allege the amount of such attorney's fees 
;•*, 3 |) because that will depend upon the extent 
of the work necessary to be performed by 
his legal counsel . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 335.) 
On the 24th day of February, 1975, 24 days after 
entry of the judgment, plaintiffs filed their notice of 
appeal from the judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO HEAR 
POINTS I AND II OF PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL BECAUSE THE NOTICE 
OF APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED, AND THE APPEAL ON 
_ r APPELLANTS' POINTS I AND II SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
It is clear from the plaintiffs' complaint that 
their action was one in unlawful detainer. Plaintiffs so Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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state in their appeal brief (Statement of the Kind of Case, 
appellants1 brief, p. 1). The notice of appeal was not 
filed until 24 days after the judgment in the matter had 
been entered. Chapter 36 of Title 78, Utah Code Annotated, 
commonly referred to as the unlawful detainer statute, con-
tains its own time period, ten days, within which a notice 
of appeal must be filed. Section 78-36-11, Utah Code Anno-
tated. This is the type of shorter time provided by law 
referred to in Rule 78 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and which shorter time is applicable to the appeal in this 
matter. 
The Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal inasmuch as the notice of appeal was not filed timely 
within the time provided in Section 78-36-11. In Fernandez 
v. Purdue, 30 U.2d 389, 518 P.2d 684 (1974), this Court 
rendered a short decision on point and which is dispositive 
of the issue of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to 
hear this appeal: 
Defendants appeal from a judgment of the 
district court, wherein plaintiff was 
awarded damages for the forcible entry, 
Sec. 78-36-1, U.C.A. 1953, of defendants 
into premises occupied by plaintiff. 
The judgment was entered on April 3, 
- _ j- 1973, and defendants filed their notice 
of appeal from that judgment on April 30, 
,;.-, j 1973. This appeal was not taken within 
ten days, the time provided in Sec. 78-36-11, 
c
 It U.C.A. 1953. This court is without juris-
diction to entertain the instant appeal. 
The appeal is dismissed. No costs 
are awarded. (Emphasis added.) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Similarly, in Coombs v. Johnson. 26 U.2d 8, 484 
P.2d 155 (1971), this Court stated: 
Plaintiffs commenced these proceedings in 
unlawful detainer in the court below seeking 
restitution of certain premises in Salt 
* Lake County. After a trial upon the issues, ° 
judgment was rendered in favor of the plain-
u
 tiffs and against the defendants, Roy j.*- ^D 
Johnson and Janice L. Johnson, and in favor 
of the defendants Percy Clark and Mrs. Percy 
Clark. The judgment was entered on July 1, 
1970, and the plaintiffs filed their notice 
of appeal from that judgment on July 15, 1970. 
It is apparent that the appeal was not taken 
within the time prescribed by Sec. 78-36-11, 
U«C.A. 1953, and this court is without juris-
diction to entertain it. 
it " l.., 16 
The appeal in this case is dismissed. 
Respondents are entitled to costs. (Footnote 
omitted; emphasis added.) 
Points I and II of appellants1 brief are appeals 
from the lower court's judgment of the unlawful detainer 
action. Count III of Nikols1 counterclaim was not dis-
missed. That count is a claim for "attorney's fees in 
connection with the defense of this action." Thus, the 
claim was not based on Nikols1 other claims in his counter-
claim, but on defense of the plaintiffs' unlawful detainer 
action. Plaintiffs' unlawful detainer action is based upon 
the lease agreement and alleged violations of said agree-
ment. In prosecuting their action, plaintiffs asked for and 
necessarily had to rely upon the Court's interpretation of 
the lease agreement in light of the facts presented at 
trial. There could be no judgment of unlawful detainer 
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unless the Court held the defendants were in violation of 
the provisions of the lease agreement. The Court's inter-
pretation of the lease as to attorney's fees, as provided in 
paragraph 16 of the lease agreement, was proper. 
In Brandley v. Lewis, 97 Utah 217, 92 P.2d 338 
(1939), the defendant appealed from an adverse judgment in 
an unlawful detainer action. The plaintiff moved for dis-
missal for defendant's failure to appeal timely. The defen-
dants asserted the action was not in unlawful detainer, but 
for declaratory judgment construing a contract. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated the following: 
Counsel for appellant then argues in 
answer to the motion to dismiss the appeal 
that the only point in issue in the cause 
was the meaning and effect of paragraph II 
of defendant's lease, and therefore the 
action was not one in unlawful detainer. 
The issues set up in the complaint as out-
lined above state a cause of action in 
\ unlawful detainer. Defendant in effect 
raised only one issue thereon, as to whether 
or not her lease had terminated. If it had 
she would be detaining unlawfully; if not, 
plaintiff must fail. Since unlawful detainer 
is an action to oust a tenant whose lease 
jr has expired or been terminated (R.S.U. 1933, 
Section 104-60-12), it follows that plain-
tiff must show that defendant's lease has 
terminated. In this cause, that termination 
depended upon the terms of the contract of 
lease. . . . To determine therefore whether 
defendant was in unlawful detainer the court 
must determine the meaning and effect of the 
paragraph, but that does not change the 
action from one in unlawful detainer. It 
.\ is merely deciding a question the decision 
of which is necessary in making a determination 
as to whether defendant is in unlawful de-
tainer. . . . The trial court determined 
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the point against defendant and entered 
judgment for restitution of the premises -'^ 
to plaintiff. From that judgment plaintiff 
seeks to appeal. Under the statute (R.S.U. r 
1933, Section 104-60-14), the appeal from 
ICT
 such judgment must be taken within 10 days.^ 3**— 
This appeal was not so taken and must there-
fore be dismissed. Hunsaker v. Harris, 37 
Utah 226, 109 P. 1; Murphy v. Paumie, 37 
Utah 228, 109 P. 2. (Emphasis added.) 
s">:*.:'• Nikols1 claim for attorney's fees was based upon 
the unlawful detainer action. The claim was a compulsory 
counterclaim because it "arises out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's 
claim . . . ." Rule 13(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
As such, it was an integral part of the unlawful detainer 
action. Appeal from the judgment based upon the claim is 
subject to the time requirements of the unlawful detainer 
statute. 
The appellants1 second point on appeal is that 
"the trial court should have found as a matter of law that 
respondents had breached the lease." Appellants' brief, p. 
11. Where the plaintiffs' action was in unlawful detainer, 
there can be no dispute that the error claimed by appellants 
required filing of the notice of appeal within the ten-day 
period. Appellants do not claim that their action was 
anything other than an unlawful detainer action, and an 
appeal from the trial court's judgment on the unlawful 
detainer claim must be filed within ten days from the date 
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of judgment. Section 78-36-11, Utah Code Annotated; Fer-
nandez v. Purdue, 30 U.2d 389, 518 P.2d 684 (1974); Coombs 
v. Johnson, 26 U.2d 8, 484 P.2d 155 (1971). This is the 
case even if the trial court must construe a written lease 
agreement. Brandley v. Lewis, 97 Utah 217, 92 P.2d 338 
(1939). 
In summary, the Supreme Court is without juris-
diction to hear the plaintiffs1 appeal from a judgment 
rendered in an action based upon the unlawful detainer 
statute inasmuch as the notice of appeal was not filed 
within ten days of the date the judgment was rendered. 
Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 Pac. 982 
(1926), is inapplicable. In Dunbar, the Court was presented 
with the issue of whether, in a statutory unlawful detainer 
action, allegations which would constitute a counterclaim 
could be set forth in the unlawful detainer action and heard 
at-trial. There, the Court was relying upon Section 6576 of 
the Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, which defined a counter-
claim, which section, together with all of the rules of 
civil procedure, have been replaced with modern rules of 
procedure, including rules regarding compulsory counter-
claims. Rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states: "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim 
which at the time of serving the pleading of the pleader has 
against any opposing party, if it arises out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
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opposing party's claim . . . ." No Utah case has been found 
,;" ft 
which defines the phrase "arises out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing partyfs 
claim." Professor Moore has stated that "any claim that is 
logically related to another claim that is being sued on is 
properly the basis for a compulsory counterclaim; only 
claims that are unrelated or are related, but within the 
exceptions, need not be pleaded." (Footnotes omitted.) 3 
Moore's Federal Practice, 1113.13, pp. 13-300-302. The ' ' 
purpose of the compulsory counterclaim rule is to avoid 
multiplicity of suits by having all logically related claims 
involving the same parties, facts or law in a single law-
suit. The transaction involved is the lease which the 
parties executed. In the plaintiffs1 claim for unlawful 
detainer, there were before the Court substantial similari-
ties of facts required to determine the defendants' claim 
for attorney's fees. Under the present rules of procedure, 
a compulsory counterclaim must be pleaded or it is barred. 
Slim Olson, Inc. v. Winegar, 122 Utah 80, 246 P.2d 608 
(1952); 3 Moore's Federal Practice, 13-297. c« i ? > 
That the defendants' counterclaim was compulsory 
is shown in several cases where the principal action was 
based upon a contract and gave rise to a compulsory counter-
claim. In United States v. Gerbus Bros* Construction Co., 
57 F.R.D. 206 (E.D. Ky. 1972), where a subcontractor brought 
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an action against the prime contractor and its bonding 
company for recovery of value of labor and materials sup-
plied , the general contractor was required to assert its 
claim that the subcontractor had breached its contract by 
compulsory counterclaim and not in a separate action. In 
Weit v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of 
Chicago, 60 F.R.D. 5 (N.D. 111. 1973), an action by holders 
of bank credit cards against banks and merchants for con-
spiracy and antitrust violations, the Court held that claims 
against the cardholders for delinquent accounts was a com-
pulsory counterclaim. See also James B. Day & Co. v. Reich-
hold Chemicals, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 387 (N.D. 111. 1973). Where 
the rule pertained to counterclaims has been given liberal 
construction and the term "transaction" is a word of flexi-
ble meaning which may comprehend a series of several occur-
rences, E. J. Korvette Co. v. Parker Pen Co., 17 F.R.D. 267 
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), it is clear that the defendant's claim for 
attorney's fees was a compulsory counterclaim, and would 
have been barred by res judicata had it not been raised in 
the trial court. 
Where the counterclaim was compulsory, it became 
an integral part of the unlawful detainer action and an 
appeal therefrom must be filed within the time prescribed by 
the statute. 
The summary nature of an unlawful detainer action 
is not jeopardized by allowing counterclaims to be included 
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in the same action when "the court in furtherance of con-
venience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of 
any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third party claim, 
or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-
claims, counterclaims, third party claims or issues." Rule 
42(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Since the Dunbar case, the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure have been adopted, and create a substantially 
different method of procedure, particularly where counter-
claims are involved. 
In addition, the plaintiffs cannot rely upon the 
holding of the Dunbar case inasmuch as no issue was raised 
in the trial court concerning whether the counterclaims 
could be heard. It is clear that "matters neither raised in 
pleadings nor put in issue at trial cannot be considered for 
the first time on appeal." Wagner v. Olsen, 25 U.2d 366, 
482 P.2d 702 (1971). See also Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 
29 U.2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 (1973); In re Ekker's Estate, 19 
U.2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967); Riter v. Cayias, 19 U.2d 358, 
431 P.2d 788 (1967). See Arnold v. Krigbaum, 146 Pac. 423 
(Cal. 1915), cited by the Court in Dunbar where, on plain-
tiff 's motion, the Court struck the defendant's counterclaim 
and refused to allow evidence at trial in support of the 
counterclaim. 
By not objecting to the defendants' counterclaims 
to the unlawful detainer action, even if such objection 
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would have been valid, the plaintiffs waived such objection, 
and the counterclaims became part and parcel of the unlawful 
detainer action. ii „j
 :;>r,- , t> J, 
Weyer v. Peterson, 16 U.2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 
(1965) , does not require a different conclusion. There, the 
seller of real estate under a uniform real estate contract 
brought an unlawful detainer action for the buyer's failure 
to make payments in accordance with the contract or to pay 
the past due amounts upon demand. The defendant appealed 
from the dismissal of his claim in equity for the value of 
his equity in the premises. The court infers that had the 
appeal been from the judgment of unlawful detainer that the 
appeal was not timely made, within the ten days provided by 
Section 78-36-11. The implication is that since the appeal 
was based upon the defendant's equitable counterclaim, that 
he was subject to the general statute concerning time within 
which an appeal must be taken. 
Where the plaintiffs brought an action in unlawful 
detainer, and appealed from judgment therein, they cannot 
rely on defendants' counterclaims as providing additional 
time within which to file their appeal from the judgment in 
unlawful detainer. Such an appeal is strictly controlled by 
the time provided by the statute. The summary nature of the 
unlawful detainer action is for the benefit of landlord and 
tenant, not to be disregarded at the landlord's desire. In 
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C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Section 431, pp. 77-78, the rule 
is stated as follows: 
A particular time or period specifically 
prescribed for the taking or perfecting of 
an appeal, proceeding in error or the like, 
{
 - in any particular action or proceeding, or 
from or to any particular judgment, order 
or decree must be observed in cases falling 
within the content and purview of such statute 
'-•-* * or rule; such special provisions are not 
deemed permissive, giving the party desirous 
of review an option between alternative times, 
namely, an election between the time thus 
specially provided and the time prescribed 
by the general provisions, where they differ, 
- ' but are ordinarily designed to secure a prompt 
hearing and a final determination in cases 
with which they deal, and hence must be com-
plied with. Thus it has been held that the 
appeal or proceeding in error or full review 
may and must be brought within the time as 
limited by the relevant statute or rule of 
court, under enactments or rules particularly 
?
 "
r
 prescribing the time for appeal . . . . 
The appeal period provided in the statute must 
prevail over any other time for taking an appeal since the 
appeal time is specifically addressed to the unlawful de-
tainer action. In 4A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Section 431 
at page 82, the following rule is stated: 
As between two such special periods, either 
of which, if it stood alone, would be capable 
''•*>- of applying to a particular situation, that 
which points the more directly and specifically 
to the case at hand is the one with which the 
party appealing must conform; . . . (Footnote 
omitted.) 
Where the action was primarily one in unlawful detainer, the 
specific appeal time provided in the statute must be applied. 
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It is obviously not appropriate to have two appeal 
times applicable to an appeal, or different claims in a 
single action. Where plaintiffs' primary action was in 
unlawful detainer, they are bound by the appeal time pro-
vided in the statute. Since there is a shortened time pro-
vided by law, it applies to all claims in the case, not just 
one. 
In summary, plaintiffs' appeal from the judgment 
of the unlawful detainer action, as set forth in Points I 
and II of their appeal brief, is subject to the appeal time 
provided in the unlawful detainer statute. The plaintiffs' 
failure to timely appeal is a jurisdictional bar to any pro-
ceedings before the Supreme Court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON THE DOCTRINES OF 
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
In a prior action commenced by the plaintiffs 
against the same defendants in the Third Judicial District 
in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the 
plaintiffs claimed and alleged certain breaches of the 
lease, which allegations of breaches were substantially 
repeated in the subsequent complaint filed in the present 
action. Those allegations which were pleaded in the first 
action and alleged again in the second action were that the 
defendant Nikols had allowed liens to be placed against the 
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premises without discharge, that the defendants required 
club members to pay a cover charge for use of the restaurant 
facilities, that the defendants refused to allow minor 
members of the club to use the restaurant facilities, that 
the defendants failed to provide the same types and quali-
ties of food and service as previously supplied to members, 
and that the defendants failed to operate the leased pre-
mises as a public restaurant, all allegedly in violation of 
the lease agreement. 
The trial court granted judgment to the defendants 
in this prior action. Subsequently, the plaintiffs com-
menced the present action and pleaded the same causes of 
action as those adjudicated in the prior action. 
This Court has previously stated in In re Town 
of West Jordan, 7 U.2d 393, 326 P.2d 105 (1958) at 107: 
. . . In the ordinary case where a judg-
ment has been granted on issues which have 
been litigated between the same parties, 
such issues under the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel cannot be relitigated in a subse-
quent but different cause of action. 
In the West Jordan case, the Court found that the action was 
based on a new ordinance which necessarily required the 
determination of different facts from those determined in 
the previous action, and therefore that the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel was not applicable.
 t 
In Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., 6 U.2d 51, 305 
P.2d 503 (1957), the Court held that where mining claimants 
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had an opportunity to defend the title to their claims in a 
prior case and failed to do so, they were precluded from 
relitigating their claims in a subsequent case where the 
rights of the same parties or their successors in interest 
are concerned. This Court, citing 30 Am.Jur. 920, §178, 
Judgments, stated: 
It is a fundamental principle of juris-
prudence that material facts or questions 
which were in issue in a former action, 
and were there admitted or judicially 
-
 i; determined, are conclusively settled by 
a judgment rendered therein, and that 
such facts or questions become res judi-
cata and may not be litigated in a sub-
sequent action between the same parties 
or their privies, regardless of the form 
the issue may take in a subsequent action 
The general rule of collateral estoppel is stated 
in Judgments, 46 Am.Jur.2d 583, §415, as follows: 
A party may be precluded under the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel from attempting a 
second time to prove a fact that he sought 
unsuccessfully to prove in a prior action. 
The rule precluding a relitigation 
of facts or questions formerly in issue 
applies whether the issue decided in the 
earlier action was presented as a grant 
of recovery or as a defense, or whether 
the issue was decided in the earlier action 
..... in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant, 
and even though the subsequent action is 
a different form of proceeding, is upon a 
different cause of action, and involves a 
v> .. different subject matter, claim, demand, 
than the earlier action. (Footnotes omitted.) 
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The doctrine of collateral estoppel is accepted in 
other jurisdictions. The case of In re Crowe, 483 P.2d 1206 
(Cal. 1971), where the Court stated the following at 1213, 
is illustrative: l ! ' ' M . ^ ^ ,- £ 
In its aspect of collateral estoppel, res 
judicata also postulates that any issue _r 
necessarily decided in civil litigation 3i 
is conclusively determined as to the par-
ties or their privies if it is involved 
in a subsequent lawsuit on a different 
cause of action. 
In Gessel v. Jones, 427 P.2d 295 (Mont. 1967), in 
holding that a judicial determination concerning child 
support estops a relitigation of the issue of the amount of 
child support, notwithstanding a contrary contractual ar-
rangement between the parties, the Court stated: 
The bar that arises from collateral ^
 f 
estoppel extends to all questions essen- J ni 
tial to the judgment and actually deter-
.; mined by a prior judgment. 
Similarly, in Wharton v. Zenger, 186 P.2d 287 
(Kan. 1947), the Court stated at 291: 
This court has always held that where a 
court has jurisdiction of the subject 
matter of an action and has jurisdiction 
of all the parties thereto, its orders 
.''V! *" and judgments as to all matters involved 
therein are final and conclusive unless 
corrected or modified on appeal, and 
that such matters cannot again be liti-
gated by the parties to that action or 
their privies, in the same court or any 
other court of concurrent jurisdiction 
upon either the same or different cause 
of action. 
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In the instant matter before this Court, the 
plaintiffs have alleged the same breaches as those alleged 
in their complaint in Civil No. 219945, and in asserting 
those alleged breaches generally relied upon precisely the 
same language of the complaint in the prior matter. Inas-
much as the Court held as a matter of law that the plain-
tiffs had waived such breaches by the acceptance of rent, 
the plaintiffs should be estopped from asserting the same 
breaches in this matter. To fail to do so would render the 
determination of the Court concerning the facts of the prior 
matter of no effect. 
The plaintiffs may not challenge the prior deter-
mination of the Court in a subsequent action. The judgment 
can only be challenged on appeal of the case in which it is 
rendered, not in a subsequent action where the claims are 
identical. Thus, the plaintiffs have lost the opportunity 
to appeal the judgment of the Court, and such failure cannot 
be corrected by filing another action, as plaintiffs have 
attempted to do here. 
Only the allegations of paragraphs 8 and 9 of 
plaintiffs1 complaint in the present action were not treated 
in the prior action. The allegations in these paragraphs 
are also barred inasmuch as any action or occurrence upon 
which the allegations were based occurred prior to the 
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payment of rent by defendant and its acceptance by plain-
tiffs. The waiver of the alleged breaches by plaintiff is a 
permanent waiver. Having full knowledge of alleged breaches 
and subsequently accepting rent under the lease effectively 
waives any rights which the plaintiffs may have had in an 
action for breach under the lease. _<> 
In Port of Walla Walla v. Sunglow Producers, Inc., 
504 P.2d 324 (Wash.App. 1972), the Court found that certain 
alleged breaches of the lease were waived by the lessor by 
acceptance of rent after the occurrence of breaches and 
lessor's knowledge of the breaches. The lease required the 
lessee to submit annual financial statements to the lessor. 
After the first year of the lease the lessor made no re-
quests for the financial reports, and the Court held that by 
accepting the rent after the breach, the lessor had waived 
its claim for forfeiture. The lease also provided that 
should the lessee be adjudicated a bankrupt, the lessor 
could, at its option, without notice, terminate the lease 
and immediately take possession of the premises. The Court 
stated: * - , 
Although the lease in question made 
lessee's bankruptcy a ground for for-
feiture, the [lessor's] non-action and 
acceptance of rentals (since the bank-
( ruptcy was not a continuing breach) 
waived the default and continued the 
lease in effect. r. •• .j.:, 
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In Signal Oil Co. v. Stebick, 245 P.2d 217 (Wash. 
1952), the Court held that the acceptance of rent by the 
lessor constituted a waiver of the lessee's breach that the 
premises be used for an automobile sales business. The 
premises had in fact not been used for an automobile sales 
business for three or four years prior to the trial of the 
matter, and rent had been accepted during such time. 
The Courts of California concur with the proposi-
tion that acceptance of rent waives breaches known by the 
lessor. In Group Property/ Inc. v. Bruce, 348 P.2d 761 (4th 
Dist./ Cal./ 1952)/ the Court held that the defendant had 
waived the breach of the lessee, the breach being failure to 
make improvements on the structure as required in the lease, 
and that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance 
of the defendant under an option to purchase the property 
which had been exercised by the plaintiff. In reaching its 
conclusion/ the Court cited the Supreme Court of the State 
of California: _
 r 
In Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good Roads 
Oil Co., 214 Cal. 435f 6 P.2d 71/ 80 
A.L.R. 453/ the lease provided that 
lessee should drill two wells each year 
until six wells had been drilled. Up 
to that time it had drilled only 13 
wells. For nearly five years, lessor, 
with full knowledge of the facts, ac-
, cepted the regular monthly royalty pay-
ments without complaint. Later/ a 
notice of breach of the terms of the 
lease was served and royalties were 
thereafter accepted. The court held 
that under these facts, the lessor 
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waived the breach of the leases and 
said (quoting from the syllabus): 
; r "The theory upon which the court held 
that acceptance of rent after the breach 
of the covenants of the lease, with 
knowledge of all the facts surrounding 
such breach, constitutes a waiver of 
such breach, is that by acceptance of 
the rent under these circumstances, the 
lessor recognizes the existence of the 
lease and that it is inconsistent and 
not permissible for a party to recog-
nize the existence of a lease and accept 
benefits under it and at the same time 
claim that it is forfeited, and seek to 
recover the fruits of the forfeiture." 
In Julian v. Gossner, 229 P.2d 786 (3d Dist., 
Cal., 1951), the Court held that the lessee's breach of the 
covenant not to sublease without lessor's consent was waived 
by acceptance of rent by lessor after knowledge of the 
sublease. Similarly, in Bedford Ind. Co. v. Fobe, 180 P.2d 
361 (2d Dist. Cal., 1947), the Court stated at 363: 
^ The right of the lessor to declare a for- '• 
r , » tt ij feiture of a lease by reason of the making 
of a sublease without the lessor's consent 
in violation of the lease is waived when 
the lessor, after knowledge of the sub-
lease, accepts the rent specified in the 
lease. 
In each of the foregoing cases, the Court held 
that acceptance of rent was a waiver of alleged breaches of 
the contract, including breaches of improper use of the pre-
mises, subleasing the premises without the lessor's consent, 
adjudication of bankruptcy, failure to provide accounting 
statements, and that the waiver of the breaches acted as a 
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bar to an action for forfeiture of the lease. The district 
court held in the prior action that the plaintiffs had 
waived the breaches alleged in their complaint by acceptance 
of the rent. That determination is res judicata on the 
issue, and the waiver is permanent and the plaintiffs should 
be estopped from asserting the same breaches in this matter. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFFS1 NOTICE TO CURE DEFAULT OR QUIT AND 
NOTICE TO QUIT ARE DEFECTIVE AND INADEQUATE TO 
SUPPORT AN ACTION IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER 
The trial court erred in denying the defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss based upon defective notices served by 
plaintiffs upon the defendants. Section 78-36-3(5), U.C.A., 
provides that a tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
[W]hen he continues in possession, in 
person or by subtenant, after the neglect 
or failure to perform any condition or 
covenant of the lease or agreement under 
which the property is held . . . and after 
notice in writing requiring in the alterna-
tive the performance of such conditions or 
covenant or the surrender of the property 
. . . Within three days after the ser-
vice of the notice, the tenant, or any 
subtenant in actual occupation of the pre-
mises . . . may perform such condition or 
covenant and thereby save the lease from 
forfeiture. 
The obvious purpose of this section is to provide notice to 
the tenant allegedly in default of the lease, notifying the 
tenant of the breaches which the lessor claims have occurred, 
and to provide three days for performing the condition or 
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covenants of the lease. For this provision to be effective, 
the lessor must give notice to the lessor which is coherent, 
understandable, and by which the tenant may identify the 
acts or circumstances which constitute the alleged violation 
of covenants or conditions. 
In American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 U.2d 432, 
464 P.2d 592, the lessor's notice stated that for failure to 
pay rent and to pay utility bills, the lessees were to quit 
the premises and deliver up possession within 15 days. The 
Supreme Court of Utah held that the notice was defective in 
that the lessees were not given notice of their alternative 
right to pay rent and to pay the utility bills. This case 
indicates the importance of specifying the lessee's right to 
cure conditions and covenants which the lessor claims are in 
default. 
In Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 U.2d 367, 393 P.2d 
468 (1964), this Court stated: 
Unlawful detainer statutes provide a 
severe remedy and must be strictly com-
plied with before the cause of action 
thereon may be maintained. 
It was held that proper notice had not been given and was 
required as a condition precedent to maintaining an action 
in unlawful detainer. ' * 
In Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196 P.2d 
714 (1948), the Court was presented with a notice specifi-
cally setting forth the acts and circumstances which the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 29 -
lessor claims were violations of the lease agreement. The 
type of notice in that case is the type contemplated by 
Section 78-36-3(5), U.C.A. 
The notice which was served upon the defendants is 
extremely general and does not state with the required 
specificity the acts and circumstances which are allegedly 
in violation of the lease agreement. 
The Notice to Cure Default or Quit (Ex. 5-P), 
specified seven violations of the lease agreement: 
1. You have not provided the same 
types and qualities of food and service 
previously supplied members. * °* 
2. You have failed to operate the 
premises as a public restaurant. 
3. You have required Towne House 
members to pay a cover charge for the use 
of the restaurant facilities. 
4. You have refused to allow minor 
members of the Towne House to use the 
premises described in the Sublease. 
5. You have failed to keep the dining 
room open during the required periods. 
6. You have failed to operate the 
restaurant in accordance with law by allow-
ing loud, boisterous and objectionable 
entertainment. 
7. You have allowed liens to be 
placed against the premises and have failed 
to remove the same. 
Each of the above points is discussed in order. 
Plaintiffs state in their Notice that the defen-
dants have not provided the same types and qualities of food 
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service previously supplied members. The Notice in no way 
indicates in what respects or what way the food and service 
were not appropriate. The Notice does not sufficiently 
inform the defendant of the nature of the claimed deficiency 
in quality and service, and thus it would be impossible for 
the defendants to undertake a good faith effort to correct 
the alleged defect. In short, the notice does not ade-
quately inform the defendants to allow them to cure the 
defects. .., ^ .,.••,•• 
The second complaint is that the defendants failed 
to operate the premises as a public restaurant. Reference 
is made to Section V.B of this brief dealing with the defi-
nition of "public" and "public place." This claimed defect 
is similar to the previous one in that the notice does not 
specify the alleged breach in such a way that it may be 
cured within the time specified by the unlawful detainer 
statute. 
The third complaint is that defendants required 
Towne House members to pay a cover charge for the use of the 
restaurant facilities. Reference is made to Section V.E in 
connection with a cover charge as a breach of the lease. 
The plaintiffs' Notice states the defendants 
refused to allow minor members of the Towne House to use the 
premises. Reference is made to Section V.C of this brief in 
connection with this alleged breach. 
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Plaintiffs' Notice alleges the defendants failed 
to keep the dining room open during the required period. 
The lease provides a rather specific statement of the time 
the defendants are required to operate the dining room. 
However, again it is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to spec-
ify the manner in which the lease is not complied with and, 
therefore, to specify the time or times claimed by plain-
tiffs that the dining room is not open as required. Only 
then can the defendants assess and determine whether they 
are in fact in breach of the terms of the lease agreement. 
The plaintiffs' claim in their notice that defen-
dants failed to operate the restaurant in accordance with 
law by allowing loud, boisterous and objectionable enter-
tainment must also fail inasmuch as the plaintiffs have 
failed to notify the defendants of the laws which were 
allegedly violated. Nor do the plaintiffs state in what 
manner or degree the entertainment is loud, boisterous or 
objectionable. In short, like the other claimed breaches, 
the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently describe them to allow 
the plaintiffs to alter the conduct or circumstances to 
comply with the provisions of the lease, if required. 
Finally, as to the defendant's alleged failure to 
remove liens and allowing liens to be filed against the 
premises, the notice does not specify the liens which al-
legedly were allowed to be placed against the premises. It 
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is not even clear that such liens, if any, were the respon-
sibility of the defendants or that they would have any legal 
obligation to remove such liens. Again, the notice fails to 
specify the manner in which the alleged defect could be 
cured within the time specified by the unlawful detainer 
statute. 
Upon receipt of the Notice to Cure Default or Quit 
and the Notice to Quit, the defendants were not and would 
not have been able to determine the claimed violations of 
the lease. Only through the discovery process and trial 
were the defendants able to determine the specific acts 
which the plaintiffs claimed were in violation of the lease. 
This is not the kind of notice which is contemplated by the 
unlawful detainer statute, and such notice as was served 
upon the defendants, as a matter of law, is defective and 
cannot support an action in unlawful detainer. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
* DEFENDANT NIKOLS WAS PROPER 
A. The Lease Agreement Provides for Award of 
Attorney's Fees. 
Paragraph 16 of the lease agreement provides for 
attorney's fees "which may arise or accrue from enforcing 
this lease or in obtaining possession of the premises or in 
pursuing any remedy provided by the laws of the State of 
Utah, whether by filing a suit or otherwise." In defending 
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the action brought by the plaintiffs, the defendants were 
merely attempting to enforce the lease and were pursuing a 
remedy provided by the laws of the State of Utah. Clearly, 
the meaning of the provision providing for costs and attor-
ney's fees includes the defense of an action to remove the 
defendants from the premises. 
This Court, in D & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 
U.2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972), and Spanish Fork Packing Co. 
v. House of Fine Meats, Inc., 29 U.2d 312, 508 P.2d 1186 
(1973), stated that the elementary principles of contract 
law are to be applied in determining the existence of and 
construing an agreement to pay attorney's fees. Certainly 
the principle of mutuality of agreement and obligation must 
exist in a provision to pay attorney's fees as was contem-
plated by the parties to the lease agreement in the present 
case. The interpretation given the provision for attorney's 
fees by the plaintiff would allow him to bring suit against 
the defendants with impunity. So long as defendants were 
not granted judgment against the plaintiff for default of 
the lease agreement, plaintiff would have no risk of being 
obligated to pay defendant's costs and attorney's fees for 
defending actions brought against them. Such cannot be 
construed to have been the meaning of the provision in the 
lease agreement or the intent of the parties in providing 
for attorney's fees. The contractual element of mutuality 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 34 -
of agreement requires that award of attorney's fees would be 
included in the case before the Court. The trial court's 
award of attorney's fees to defendant Nikols should be 
affirmed on the language of the lease agreement and such 
principles of contract law. 
B. When the Trial Court Specifically Dismissed 
Plaintiffs' Complaint Against Defendants, No Cause of Action, 
the Court Should Have Found as a Matter of Law that the 
Plaintiffs Had Breached the Covenant of Quiet and Peaceful 
Possession. 
Paragraph 11 of the lease agreement provides: 
"Sublessor covenants that as long as sublessee is not in 
default under this sublease, he shall quietly and peaceably 
hold the premises." It has been held that prosecution of 
forceable entry and detainer actions and service of notices 
to quit upon a tenant constitute violation of the covenant 
of quiet enjoyment. In Kuiken v. Garrett, 51 N.W.2d 149, 41 
A.L.R.2d 1397 (Iowa, 1952), the Supreme Court of Iowa, in an 
action for breach of the implied covenant for quiet enjoy-
ment, stated the following: nr^*. 
' '' *" We hold that it is not always that a tenant 
in possession can be denied the right to 
!
 - ^ damages because he remains upon the realty; 
but that if the landlord harasses and annoys 
him and disturbs his quiet enjoyment, by 
a systematic course of oppression or inter-
*
:
 ference, just compensation may be required. 
This is true even though the tenant's action 
is founded, as we think it is here, on con-
tract rather than in tort. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa also allowed attorney's fees, even 
in absence of a written agreement therefor, caused by a 
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wrongful interference with the tenant's right of quiet 
enjoyment. 
- In the present case, the plaintiff served two 
notices and filed a suit in a prior action against defendant 
Nikols. When a summary judgment was awarded in favor of the 
defendants and against the plaintiffs, a second action, 
preceded by two notices, was filed by the plaintiffs against 
the same defendants. Under these circumstances, as in 
Kuiken, the lessor has breached the covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment, and the defendants were entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, including the award of attorney's fees. 
In Hubble v. Cole, 13 S.E. 1441 (Va., 1891), a 
tenant brought action against his lessor for unlawfully 
being restrained from the use of the premises. The Court 
held that the action was properly brought, that the plain-
tiff's remedy was not exclusively upon the bond, and that 
the dissolution of the injunction was conclusive that the 
lessor's action was initiated without sufficient cause, for 
which the lessor would be responsible in damages. In the 
present case, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's 
complaint, no cause of action, and the defendants were en-
titled to a judgment that the covenant of quiet enjoyment 
had been breached. 
Where the plaintiffs had instituted a second 
action predicated upon the unlawful detainer statute, pre-
ceded by a Notice to Cure Default or Quit and a Notice to 
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Quit served upon the defendants, and which action contained 
alleged breaches pleaded in the prior action, the trial 
court should have found as a matter of law that the plain-
tiffs had breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment. .•.,-•, 
-...,,.*
 v POINT V r ;<•--*, 
ANY CHANGE IN THE OPERATION OF THE LEASED 
PREMISES WAS NOT A BREACH OF THE LEASE ",i 9 D 
Two provisions of the lease are pertinent to this 
issue. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the lease provide: 
4. Use of Premises. Heretofore Sub-
lessor has prepared and served food and 
beverages on the above-described premises 
^ ,y]. . in operating the Towne House Athletic Club , 
thereon. Sublessee assumes the operation 
* :.* . of preparing and serving such food and 
beverages to the members of the said Club 
in the main dining room and kitchen area. 
Sublessee shall have such use of the pre-
° mises as shall be reasonable and desirable 
to facilitate the preparation and dispensing 
_ of such foods and beverages. Sublessee
 : 
shall use said premises strictly in accord 
with all applicable federal, state and 
local laws, rules and ordinances. 
5. Scope of Operation. Sublessee 
shall have available and prepare and 
serve to members of the said Club on 
::l the premises food and beverages in the ^ 
types and qualities presently being 
served and shall serve the same on the 
days and hours when the same are pre-
f . 1 sently available. Food and beverages ., 
are served on the days and at the times 
as follows: , • r , 
Lunch Monday through Friday 
11:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. 
Dinner ' " Saturday 
. ,n 4 , , ,-n
 7
-
30
 P-m- t o 11^0° P-m-
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In addition, Sublessee shall have sandwiches 
and drinks available Monday through Saturday 
from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. 
Sublessee may offer additional ser-
vice as he, in his sole discretion, shall 
determine. 
A. The Required Food Was Available at All Re-
quired Times. 
The defendant George Anagnostakis testified that 
dinner was available between 7:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. on 
Saturdays, that sandwiches and drinks are available Monday 
through Saturday from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., and that in 
addition, dinner is available on weeknights from 8:00 until 
11:00, and dinner is also available Friday and Saturday from 
8:00 until 12:00 (R. 187-8). Not only are these times 
consistent with the times provided in paragraph 5 of the 
lease, but dinner is available during the weeknights, which 
is not required by paragraph 5 of the lease agreement. 
Certainly this is consistent with the provision of paragraph 
5 which states: "Sublessee may offer additional service as 
he, in his sole discretion, shall determine." There is no 
evidence that food was not served as required by the lease. 
The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants 
failed to serve the types and qualities of food required by 
the lease. No evidence was introduced that the quality of 
food served by the defendants was not in accordance with the 
requirements of the lease. Plaintiffs seem to assert that 
if the defendants failed to offer the number of salads and 
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entrees offered by plaintiff, that the defendants are not 
offering the "types" of food required by the lease. There i 
is nothing in the lease which lends any support to such a 
construction, and the word "type" cannot be construed to I 
mean "variety" and "quantity" as plaintiffs attempt to 
attribute to the word.
 r ] 
B. In Absence of Specific Limitation in the . 
Lease, a Tenant May Use the Premises for Whatever Lawful 
Purpose He Desires. ' 
A provision in a lease authorizing the use of the I 
premises for a specified purpose is generally regarded as 
permissive rather than restrictive, and does not limit the J 
use of the premises by the lessee to such purpose nor forbid . 
that they be used for a similar lawful purpose which is not • 
injurious to the landlord's rights or not otherwise expressly I 
forbidden. In Beck v. Giordano, 356 P.2d 264 (Colo. 1960), 
the Colorado Supreme Court was requested to construe a I 
provision of the lease regarding use of the premises "to 
occupy the same as a restaurant". The defendant had per- • 
mitted a fireworks stand to be operated on the premises for I 
a short period of time. The Court held that the defendant's 
act was not specifically prohibited, and therefore did not I 
constitute a breach of the lease. 
A lease agreement may impose restrictions as to I 
the use of the leased property upon the tenant. However, l 
such restrictions, to be valid, must be express provisions. 
i Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 39 -
The lease between the plaintiffs and defendant Nick N. 
Nikols contains no specific restriction which can be con-
strued to limit the use of the premises to a restaurant 
only/ with no other use permitted. On the contrary, the 
lease contains permissive language in connection with the 
preparation and dispensing of foods. 
Inasmuch as the lease contains no provisions which 
limit or restrict the use of the premises by the defendantsf 
so long as food is served as provided in paragraphs 4 and 5 
of the lease, the premises may be used for any reasonable, 
lawful purpose. 
Thus, the points made in paragraphs 13, 14, 16, 17 
and 18 of plaintiffs' Statement of Facts are irrelevant and 
immaterial, and plaintiffs1 argument that changing the 
operation of the restaurant constituted a breach of the 
lease as a matter of law is contrary to the law cited above. 
Counsel for plaintiff cites no authority which states that a 
change or expansion of a business or service constitutes a 
breach of a lease in absence of a provision restricting the 
operation of the premises to a particular business or pur-
pose, -s-f -»-*: -•-..• * ~ ..*... <w.. .-..,-. ,,„,^ 
There was no evidence that the defendants had 
failed to provide the types and qualities of food which had 
been served by the plaintiff. 
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C. There Was No Evidence That the Defendants Ever 
Refused Food Service or Entry of a Member of the Salt Lake 
Athletic Club. v ^ , ,. c •.. -/-„.. ... * 
Counsel for the plaintiffs attempts to make defen-
dant Aggie's possession of a Class "C" beer license ex-
tremely significant. There is no dispute that the Class "C" 
beer license makes it unlawful for the licensee to permit 
any person under the age of 21 years to remain in or about 
the licensed premises. There is further no contention that 
the defendant Aggie ever violated the ordinance. In para-
graph 2 of plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, brief of plaintiffs-
appellants , the plaintiffs state the number of members of 
the Salt Lake Athletic Club, including memberships issued to 
minors. The Court sustained the defendants' objection that 
the plaintiff Ted Stevensen's testimony was not the best 
evidence of the types of memberships and their rights, 
including the facilities available to them. There was no 
evidence before the Court that any minor person was a member 
of the Salt Lake Athletic Club. L •'v 
Paragraph 5 of the lease agreement refers to 
members of the Club, not to their guests or families or 
children. The defendants are not parties to the house rules 
of the Salt Lake Athletic Club (Ex. 19-P), nor are they 
bound by it. It was not made a part of nor even referred to 
in the lease agreement. . -
Not only do the plaintiffs fail to prove there is 
such a thing as a minor member of the Club, but also fail to 
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establish in what way the excluding of a minor person from 
the premises licensed as a Class "C" beer license is in 
violation of the lease agreement. In paragraph 4 of the 
lease agreement, the defendants covenant to comply with the 
applicable federal, state and local laws, rules and ordi-
nances. Clearly, to allow a minor to enter into the pre-
mises would be a violation of that provision of the lease. 
In summary, plaintiffs have failed to establish a 
violation of the lease, and defendants have shown that their 
operation is in accordance with applicable ordinances. 
D. The Premises Were Operated as a Public Res-
taurant Consistent with the Terms of the Lease. 
Section 20-14-1 of the Salt Lake City Ordinances 
defines restaurant as "any place where food or drink is pre-
pared, served or offered for sale or sold for human consump-
tion on or off the premises." It is uncontradicted that 
Aggie has such a license (Ex. 10-P), and is thus duly li-
censed to transact business within Salt Lake City. The 
plaintiffs attempt to define restaurant in terms of the Salt 
Lake City Zoning Ordinances, but do not make any claim that 
a restaurant in the premises is in violation of the ordi-
nance. Thus, such a definition is only meaningful to the 
zoning ordinance and the zones in which a restaurant is 
authorized to be operated. The cases cited by plaintiff, 
Leograndis v. Liquor Control Commission, 149 Conn. 507, 182 
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A.2d 9 (Sup.Ct. Err. 1962), and Fulford v. Board of Zoning 
Adjustment of City of Dothan, 256 Ala. 336, 54 A.2d 580 
(1951), are inapplicable in that they deal with inapplicable 
statutes, and Fulford is a case dealing with violation of 
zoning ordinances. 
In an attempt to determine the meaning of the word 
"public," note may first be made of the difficulty of de-
fining the term. In 73 C.J.S. at 274-5, it is stated: 
It has been said that the word "public" 
is familiar to everyone. However, it is 
a term of most varied and indefinite 
connotation, a convertible term, and 
it does not have a fixed or definite 
meaning. 
Among the definitions of "public" in this section, are found 
the following: 
"Public" is also defined or employed as 
meaning the inhabitants of a particular 
place; all the inhabitants of a parti-
-
 r:
- cular place; the people of the neighbor-
hood; a particular body or section of the 
people; often, specifically, a clientele. C' 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
And at 73 C.J.S. 276: 
Thus, in certain situations the word 
"public" means operated for the benefit 
of the public, rather than for the bene-
1
 ' "' fit of a private individual; but the 
term may mean open for the use, enjoy-
ment, and participation of the public 
generally, even though a fee is charged, 
as, a public dance hall, a public car- -
rier, etc. (Footnotes omitted.) 
In 70 C.J.S. at 1095-6, the term "public place" is defined: 
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As applied to an enclosure/ room or 
building, a "public place" must be con-
sidered as one wherein, by general invi-
tation , members of the public attend 
for reasons of business, entertainment, 
instruction, or the like, and are wel-
come as long as they conform to what is 
customarily done there. (Footnote omitted,) 
The decisions of several courts shed light on the 
definition of "public" and "public place". In Peachey v. 
Boswell, 167 N.E.2d 48, 89 A.L.R.2d 801 (Ind. 1960), the 
Court was asked to determine whether a business which uti-
lized a certain type of pinball machine was in violation of 
anti-gambling statutes of the State of Indiana. The statute 
in question included the definition of professional gambling 
as "maintaining . . . pinball machines which award anything 
other than an immediate and unrecorded right of replay . . . 
in any place accessible to the public; . . . " (Emphasis 
added.) After referring to Webster's definitions of "ac-
cessible" and "public", the Court stated: 
A place may be accessible to the public 
for gambling notwithstanding that every 
person who desires is not permitted 
access thereto. Lockhart v. State, 
(1853) 10 Tex. 275, 276. 
It has also been held in a case 
involving a prohibition law that by 
"public" is meant that the public is 
invited to come to the place and has 
access to it for the purpose within 
the scope of the business there main-
tained. Brooks v. State (1916), 19 
Ga.App. 3, 90 S.E. 989, 991. 
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From a consideration of the terms 
"accessible," "public" and "public place," 
as defined hereinabove, together with the 
purpose of the act, we have concluded that 
the phrase "in any place accessible to the 
public . . . " means any place where the 
public is invited and are free to go 
upon special or implied invitation — 
a place available to all or to a certain 
segment of the public. 
In Askew v. Parker, 312 P.2d 342 (Cal. Ct. of 
App., 4th Dist., 1957), the question before the Court was 
whether a swimming pool is a "public swimming pool" within 
the meaning of the Health and Safety Code of the State of 
California where the owner of the pool: 
. . . sent out about 300 to 400 general 
written invitations, by mail, to all post 
office box holders and RFD box holders, 
through the U.S. Post Office at Valley 
ic Center, to all the teenaged children in 
that community to use the pool free of 
.•:.,.- ,
 :: s charge. Over 100 of these children regis-
tered to use the pool. During the summer 
session of 1955, it was used by 40 to 60 
of these children every day except Satur-
days and Sundays. The pool was fenced and 
no persons were admitted except those who 
could qualify under the general invita-
tions sent out. 
The Court held that the pool was a public swimming pool 
within the meaning of the statute. It is clear that re-
stricting the use of a place to certain persons or classes 
of persons does not eliminate such a place as being "public" 
See also Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., 86 P.2d 
102, (Cal. 1939). 
Finally, in Ginter v. Commonwealth, 262 S.W.2d 178 
(Ct. of App., Ken., 1953), the appellant challenged his 
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conviction of intoxication in a public place on the basis 
that the alleged drunkenness did not occur in a public place 
within the meaning of the statute. The Court held that "a 
combined beer tavern and restaurant is a public place" 
without further comment. 
E. The "Cover Charge" is not in Violation of the 
Lease Agreement. 
Inasmuch as the defendants are entitled to add 
services and otherwise enlarge upon the business they con-
duct in the premises (see Sections V.A and V.B of this brief 
above), the fact that a charge is made for such additional 
services or merely as a means of securing payment for ser-
vices offered does not constitute a violation of the lease 
agreement. 
POINT VI 
THE ALLEGED BREACHES CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT 
SUFFICIENT TO RESULT IN A FORFEITURE OF THE 
DEFENDANTS1 LEASE AGREEMENT 
Provisions for forfeitures in contracts and leases 
are not favored in law or in equity and are strictly con-
strued against the party seeking to invoke forfeiture. In 
Chopot v. Foster, 318 P.2d 976 (Wash. 1957), the Supreme 
Court of Washington found that there was no evidence of a 
violation of the provision of a lease that the lease "shall 
not be assigned to any other person without a written con-
sent of the lessor." The Court went beyond the evidence 
question and stated: "An assignment will not work a for-
feiture without a forfeiture provision in the lease itself, 
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and this lease contains none." In support of its conclu-
sion, the Court cited 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, Sec-
tion 104(b), pp. 680, 683, as follows: 
In general, a tenant cannot be terminated 
for breach of covenant by the lessee unless 
there is an express provision in the lease 
for forfeiture or right of re-entry in such 
case. 
- - i\ Similarly, the Supreme Court of Oregon, in Western 
Builders & Tractors Parts, Inc. v. Felmley, 391 P.2d 383 
(Ore. 1964), stated: > , 
••— It is a well-established rule of law that
 r 
forfeitures are not favored and, in the 
absence of an agreement for forfeiture or 
a statute providing therefor, a lessor may 
not terminate the lease for breach of a 
covenant. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado, in Murphy v. Traynor, 
135 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1943), dealt with the issue of forfeiture 
of a lease. In this case, the lease provided that the 
lessee would "not use or permit the said premises to be used 
for any purposes prohibited by the laws of the United States 
or the State of Colorado, or by the ordinances of the County 
of Jefferson, nor for any other purpose than for the purpose 
of selling of wine, beer and liquors, for the purpose of a 
restaurant, and for the purpose of operating a gasoline 
filling station and automobile repair shop." The lessee was 
subsequently convicted of an unlawful sale of liquor to a 
minor, which resulted in the revocation of the lessee's 
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liquor license. The Court noted that "it is a settled 
principle of both law and equity that contractual provisions 
for forfeitures are looked upon with disfavor . . . and that 
this applies with full force to stipulations found in leases 
and hence the rule that they are to be strictly construed 
against the party seeking to invoke them." The Court con-
cluded that the conviction of one sale of liquor to a minor 
did not justify a forfeiture under the provisions of the 
lease. 
The lease between appellants and respondent Nikols 
has no provision for a forfeiture of the lease upon the 
breach of a covenant contained therein. Paragraph 16 of the 
lease agreement provides that for failure to pay rent, suit 
for recovery of the leased premises may be instituted. The 
second paragraph of paragraph 16 of the lease provides as 
follows: 
Sublessor and sublessee agree that 
if either defaults in any of the conditions 
and terms of this lease, the defaulting 
party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including attorney's feesf which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this lease or in 
obtaining possession of the premises or 
in pursuing any remedy provided by the 
laws of the State of Utah, whether by 
filing suit or otherwise. 
There is no express provision herein that a default in any 
of the conditions or terms of the lease shall result in a 
forfeiture of the lease, and therefore there can be no for-
feiture. See Beck v. Giordano, 356 P.2d 264 (Colo. 1960). 
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. - - . • t ,, • CONCLUSION : 
The plaintiffs' appeal should be dismissed because 
it was not timely taken from the judgment of the trial 
C O U r t . . . / L : n , ' . - • • • ,....': .' .-..: ' • ••;•'..••:-• P. c - . z 
^ -., If the appeal is not dismissed, the trial court 
should be affirmed in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and 
awarding defendant Nikols attorney's fees. The record 
clearly shows that the trial court's judgment was warranted 
and supported by the evidence. 
The trial court erred in not dismissing plain-
tiffs' complaint upon the defendants' motion to dismiss the 
complaint as barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, 
and defective notices. 
In any event, plaintiffs' evidence failed to 
establish that the lease had been breached to a degree, if 
it had been breached at all, to result in a forfeiture. 
The appeal should be dismissed, the judgment 
affirmed, or the judgment should be affirmed in part and 
reversed as set forth in this brief, and defendant Nikols 
should be awarded his costs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of August, 
1975. 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
Hardin A. Whitney and 
,,, lb* -i..*r;" ^ rJ:, .1 ..• Wayne G. Petty 
600 Deseret Plaza 
:) ; , Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of 
Defendant-Respondent Nikols to the following, postage pre-
paid, this 18th day of August, 1975: 
James A. Arrowsmith, Esq. 
WATKINS & FABER 
606 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
F. Alan Fletcher, Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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